Civil Procedure-Swiming Up the  Stream of Commerce : Clarifying Minnesota\u27s Personal Jurisdiction Position afrer Asahi-Jueuch v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp by Bartsh, Alicia M.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 4 Article 6
2006
Civil Procedure-Swiming Up the "Stream of
Commerce": Clarifying Minnesota's Personal
Jurisdiction Position afrer Asahi-Jueuch v. Yamazaki
Mazak Optonics Corp
Alicia M. Bartsh
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Bartsh, Alicia M. (2006) "Civil Procedure-Swiming Up the "Stream of Commerce": Clarifying Minnesota's Personal Jurisdiction
Position afrer Asahi-Jueuch v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/6
07BARTSH.DOC 5/31/2006 1:12:31 PM 
 
1409 
CASE NOTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE—SWIMMING UP THE 
“STREAM OF COMMERCE”: CLARIFYING MINNESOTA’S 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION POSITION AFTER ASAHI—
JUELICH V. YAMAZAKI MAZAK OPTONICS CORP. 
Alicia M. Bartsh† 
  
 I.  INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1409 
 II.  HISTORY OF THE LAW .......................................................... 1411 
 A.   The Power Theory: Pennoyer v. Neff .............................. 1411 
 B.   Shifting to Minimum Contacts: International Shoe v. 
Washington .................................................................. 1413 
 C.   Refining the Stream of Commerce Theory: World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.................................... 1416 
 D.   The Power Struggle Continues: Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court of California............................. 1418 
 E.   Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota .................................. 1419 
 III.  THE JUELICH DECISION ........................................................ 1424 
 A.   Facts and Procedural History ........................................... 1424 
 B.   The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision ......................... 1425 
 1.   A Personal Jurisdiction Platform ................................1425 
 2.   The Stream of Commerce Approach .............................1427 
 3.   A Closer Look at the Five-Factor Approach...................1428 
 IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE JUELICH DECISION .................................... 1430 
 A.   The Stream of Commerce Issue.......................................... 1430 
 B.   The Fair Play and Substantial Justice Issue ...................... 1431 
 C.   Asahi Criticism? ............................................................. 1432 
 V.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1433 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Simply stated, personal jurisdiction represents a court’s power 
 
       †   J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008; B.A., Economics, 
Macalester College, 1997. 
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to bind parties to a judicial action.1  However, during the last 
century, the conflicts and laws that have emerged across the United 
States to regulate personal jurisdiction are far from simple.2  
Particularly, the rationale for “hauling” foreign defendants into 
court has grown increasingly more complex due to advancing 
technology and expanding global markets.3  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court has tried to provide answers, from the “minimum 
contacts” analysis to varying “stream of commerce” theories, 
personal jurisdiction remains a murky area for interpretation.4 
Minnesota has not escaped the confusion that surrounds 
personal jurisdiction.5  In fact, in Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics 
Corp.,6 the Minnesota Supreme Court was forced to analyze 
personal jurisdiction in light of the infamous U.S. Supreme Court 
plurality opinion Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California.7  Asahi has placed a gray cloud over personal jurisdiction 
by articulating, but with divided support, a much stricter standard 
for defining “minimum contacts” and the “stream of commerce” 
theory in products liability cases.8  Nonetheless, Juelich manages to 
offer some clarity for Minnesota law by providing its own 
interpretation of Asahi, revisiting its position on the “stream of 
commerce” theory, and subsequently reaffirming its five-factor test 
for personal jurisdiction.9  Even though it neglects to elaborate on 
a broader issue of foreign-national defendants, the case is of 
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 666 
(3d ed. 2000) (noting that “jurisdiction has continued to plague lawyers, judges 
and law students” in describing the evolution of personal jurisdiction law). 
 3. See Kristin R. Baker, Comment Products Liability Suits and the Stream of 
Commerce After Asahi: World-Wide Volkswagen is Still the Answer, 35 TULSA L.J. 705, 
708-13 (2000) (discussing growth in the international economy and the 
development of the “stream of commerce” theory of minimum contacts). 
 4. See Scott M. Hagel, Case Note, Civil Procedure—The Stream of Commerce 
Theory in Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit?  In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, 24 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 231, 231-39 (1998) (criticizing the development of “minimum 
contacts” and “stream of commerce” theories in the United States). 
 5. Id. at 241-44. 
 6. 682 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2004). 
 7. Id. at 567-68 (citing significant similarities to Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1987) (plurality opinion)). 
 8. Baker, supra note 3, at 705 (“Asahi further confused the issue because the 
Court split . . . over the amount of contact required in the stream of commerce 
analysis.”); see also Hagel, supra note 4, at 237 (“Rather than clarifying the area, a 
divided [Asahi] Court could agree only on the result.”). 
 9. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 568, 571-73. 
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significant importance due to its resolution of the “stream of 
commerce” application in Minnesota.10  In effect, Juelich rejects 
Asahi’s stricter standard for placing products into the “stream of 
commerce” and suggests that either direct or indirect contacts with 
a forum may be sufficient for personal jurisdiction.11 
First, this Case Note explores the development of personal 
jurisdiction theory in the United States and how it has shaped 
current Minnesota law.12  Then, it investigates the facts of Juelich13 
and analyzes the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision considering 
the legacy of Asahi.14  Finally, it concludes that the Juelich court 
rightly rejects Asahi’s stringent “stream of commerce” analysis and 
provides needed clarity to Minnesota’s position, even if it avoids a 
more general issue concerning foreign-national defendants.15 
II.  HISTORY OF THE LAW 
A.   The Power Theory: Pennoyer v. Neff16 
As acknowledged above, the U.S. Supreme Court has spent 
more than one hundred years attempting to create guidelines for 
personal jurisdiction.17  In fact, the original chief basis for personal 
jurisdiction dates back to the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in 
Pennoyer v. Neff.18  The Pennoyer Court developed the gold standard 
rule: jurisdiction is warranted when a defendant is physically present 
within a forum state and simultaneously served there with process.19  
 
 10. Id. at 575. 
 11. Id. at 571 (“This court has recognized that minimum contacts may be 
indirect, under the stream of commerce theory.”). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 17. Hagel, supra note 4, at 231 (“Over the last fifty years the United States 
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify [personal jurisdiction] standards . . . .”).  
See generally Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” for International Shoe (and None for 
Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 755 (1995) (discussing the past and potential future of personal jurisdiction). 
 18. 95 U.S. at 714.  As the genesis of personal jurisdiction law, Pennoyer makes 
a party’s presence within a forum the primary method for obtaining jurisdiction.  
Id.  The Court defends its position in Pennoyer by adhering to “universal law.”  Id. at 
720. 
 19. Id. at 714 (representing the U.S. Supreme Court’s first significant rule 
3
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Essentially, the holding gave rise to the theory of “territorial 
power,” by declaring that every state may claim individual 
sovereignty over the persons, corporations, and land located within 
its boundaries.20 
Although the immediate Pennoyer rule dealt with establishing 
personal jurisdiction over natural persons, similar standards soon 
evolved for binding corporations.21  Specifically, a corporation was 
bound by traditional notions of personal jurisdiction if it was (1) 
incorporated in the forum state; (2) “doing business” there; or (3) 
had consented, either expressly or impliedly, to jurisdiction in that 
state.22  Nonetheless, as interstate commerce and business on a 
 
regarding personal jurisdiction and a court’s power to bind parties to an action).  
“Service of process” refers to the action by which a complaint and summons, each 
in paper form, are delivered together to a named defendant.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4.  
The summons is a piece of paper that represents the power of a court (federal or 
state) to bind the parties of the action so identified in the complaint.  Id.  Thus, 
the actual service of a summons represents the power to be bound.  Id. 
 20. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.  The Pennoyer Court stated, “[t]he authority of 
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which 
it is established.”  Id.  Pennoyer’s notion of state sovereignty has further developed 
into the basis of transient jurisdiction, a court’s ability to obtain jurisdiction by 
serving a defendant when he or she is temporarily physically present in a state.  
MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 674 (discussing Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 
442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), in which a court found personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant who was served with process while flying on a passenger airplane over 
the forum State of Arkansas).  Subsequently, legal authorities have challenged the 
constitutional soundness of transient jurisdiction.  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 202-03 (1977).  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, albeit in a plurality opinion 
of questionable precedential value, has continued to uphold its practice.  See 
generally Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality 
opinion). 
 21. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86 (“[T]here developed a doctrine 
of corporate ‘presence’—a corporation was present where it engaged in a 
sufficient amount of activities, and it could therefore be . . . ‘doing business.’”).  
Rules for measuring personal jurisdiction can be distinguished between binding 
natural persons versus corporations.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714.  The criteria for 
power over natural persons, primarily derived from Pennoyer, are (1) defendant is 
served with process while physically present in the forum; (2) defendant is 
domiciled in the forum; or (3) defendant gives consent, either expressly or 
impliedly.  Id. at 714, 723, 735.  Compare Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) 
(defining express consent), with Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (defining 
implied consent).  For the recognized definition of what constitutes a “domicile” 
in jurisdictional issues, see also Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 22. Standards of incorporation are based on Pennoyer, while standards of 
express and implied consent are based on Kane and Hess, respectively.  Hess, 274 
U.S. at 356; Kane, 242 U.S. at 167.  But in evaluating a “doing business” standard, 
see MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86. 
4
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national scale increased, it became more difficult for courts to rely 
on traditional principles of personal jurisdiction when binding 
defendants, especially corporations.23 
A frustrating legal challenge that soon developed was a 
corporation’s ability to easily “be present” in multiple jurisdictions 
at one time.24  As is still the case today, a corporation was not 
limited to conducting business in the state of its headquarters but 
could choose to engage in commerce across state lines.25  Thus, 
determining whether or not a corporation was sufficiently “doing 
business” in a forum state to warrant personal jurisdiction under 
Pennoyer’s traditional methods began to fuel questions of fairness, 
as well as constitutionality.26  In general, due to pressures of 
industrialization and a growing economy, jurisdiction over foreign-
state corporations was becoming increasingly complex.27  By the 
mid-twentieth century, an additional means for dealing with these 
issues was urgently needed.28 
B.   Shifting to Minimum Contacts: International Shoe v. 
Washington29 
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court moved away from 
strict insistence on Pennoyer and revealed a supplemental test based 
on a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state.30  The 
landmark formula developed by the Court in International Shoe 
requires sufficient “minimum contacts” with a forum so that the 
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a party does not offend 
 
 23. In Hanson v. Denckla, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “[a]s technological 
progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for 
jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.  At the same time, 
progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in 
a foreign tribunal less burdensome.”  357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); see also MARCUS 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86 (discussing jurisdiction over corporate defendants). 
 24. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 232. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id.; see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also infra 
note 31 and accompanying text (describing the need to adhere to the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in personal jurisdiction cases). 
 27. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 232-33. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 30. Id. at 316; see also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (“[T]he requirements for 
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of 
Pennoyer . . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe.”). 
5
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traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice” embodied 
in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.31  With regard 
to corporations, the prior “doing business” test for personal 
jurisdiction was replaced by a more liberal “minimum contacts” 
analysis.32 
Although International Shoe is highly regarded for its 
advancement of a Constitutional requirement in personal 
jurisdiction, the case is not entirely clear on how to analyze 
“minimum contacts.”33  For instance, the Court seems especially 
concerned that the defendant’s contact with the forum state be 
“continuous and systematic.”34  Yet, the Court does not define a 
process for differentiating such behavior on a case-by-case basis 
while keeping in balance with the concepts of “fair play and 
substantial justice.”35  Moreover, the decision does not address what 
kinds of limits, if any, should be placed on “minimum contacts” 
when establishing personal jurisdiction.36  In effect, International 
Shoe creates a broad requirement of “minimum contacts” that lacks 
 
 31. As further elaborated by the Court in International Shoe: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment . . . , if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he 
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.” 
326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 32. See id. at 316.  Although the facts of International Shoe involve a corporate 
defendant, the language used to describe the minimum contacts test also seems 
applicable to individuals and has been held to “apply generally to all defendants.”  
See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 691-92 n.1. 
 33. Justice Black, in a harsh dissent in International Shoe, finds that the 
majority has not presented a “workable standard” that can be used to analyze 
personal jurisdiction situations.  326 U.S. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Black states, instead of providing a solid framework, “the Court . . . has engaged in 
an unnecessary discussion in the course of which it has announced vague 
Constitutional criteria applied for the first time to the issue before us.  It has thus 
introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern . . . .”  Id. 
 34. Id. at 320 (“Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of 
appellant in the State of Washington were neither irregular nor casual.  They were 
systematic and continuous . . . .”).  Ultimately, International Shoe meshes the 
“systematic and continuous” requirement with that of minimum contacts.  See id. 
 35. See id. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 36. In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court addresses limits on the “flexible” 
jurisdiction requirements expressed in International Shoe.  357 U.S. 235, 251 
(1958).  Hanson enforces the need for minimum contacts to justify personal 
jurisdiction but couples this requirement with the need for purposeful availment.  
Id. at 253. 
6
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directive constraints.37 
Not surprisingly, the analytical framework that has evolved in 
applying this standard is far from straightforward as courts across 
the country have grappled with how to interpret “minimum 
contacts.”38  Many state legislatures initially responded to 
International Shoe by enacting “long-arm statutes” designating how 
states could bind foreign defendants.39  Long-arm statutes, which 
still exist today, aim to validate a state’s jurisdictional power over 
foreign defendants not actually present within a state’s territory.40  
These laws describe the kinds of cases that merit exercising 
personal jurisdiction over a foreign party.41 
Such statutes have tended to vary significantly from state to 
state, running the spectrum from broad to narrow.42  For 
consistency, the Supreme Court has placed significant limits on 
long-arm statutes, especially in products liability suits, so that an 
International Shoe “minimum contacts” analysis is almost always 
required.43  Furthermore, by reviewing more personal jurisdiction 
 
 37. See id. at 251 (“[I]t is a mistake to assume that [the evolution to 
International Shoe’s flexible standard] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions 
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”). 
 38. See Baker, supra note 3, at 713-21 (discussing circuit court responses to 
application of “stream of commerce” theories); see also Silberman, supra note 17, at 
755 (“Justice Black did warn that the ‘minimum contacts’ test was an unworkable 
one, and he certainly was right in predicting that such elastic criteria would leave 
judges the ‘supreme arbiters’ of jurisdictional standards.”).  In fact, regarding the 
difficulties in interpreting personal jurisdiction, one commentator has questioned 
whether many lower courts have even bothered to adopt the different theories set 
forth by the Supreme Court.  Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (studying approximately 1000 published state 
personal jurisdiction cases from 1970 to 1994 and finding that changes in the law 
have been rather modest). 
 39. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 697.  Illinois enacted the first long-arm 
statute in 1955.  Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 697, 701 n.2, 703 n.7.  For example, California has historically 
maintained a very broad statute extending to the limit of the Constitution, while 
Illinois has been comparatively more restrictive.  Id. at 697. 
 43. Id. at 704 n.8.  Even if a state has a long-arm statute, the ultimate test for 
personal jurisdiction should still follow a minimum contacts analysis based on 
International Shoe.  Id.  Language in long-arm statutes will commonly indicate limits 
based on the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  See id. at 703 n.7; see 
also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (“The standard for determining 
whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with 
the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in 
International Shoe.”). 
7
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cases in light of International Shoe, the Supreme Court has 
developed additional criteria to aid in evaluating “minimum 
contacts” situations.44 
C.   Refining the Stream of Commerce Theory: World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson45 
Specifically, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court 
applied a “stream of commerce” theory, suggesting that a 
manufacturer or distributor might be subject to suit in a forum 
state for “directly or indirectly” placing its products into the 
forum.46  Notably, “seek[ing] to serve” the market through indirect 
contact was deemed acceptable to substantiate personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant.47  However, World-Wide Volkswagen also asserted 
that a defendant must “purposefully avail[] itself” of the benefits of 
the forum state to logically foresee being “haled” into its courts; 
 
 44. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 706.  During the twenty years following 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court was virtually silent on issues of personal 
jurisdiction.  Id.  But, as more cases have since been decided, criteria for personal 
jurisdiction and minimum contacts have been refined.  Id.  Yet, at least one 
commentator has found such refinements to be “arbitrary particularizations.”  Id. 
(citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 241 SUP. 
CT. REV. 283 (1965)).  Nonetheless, later cases have helped to shape factors 
determinative of minimum contacts.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (substantiating the stream of commerce theory 
of minimum contacts); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (describing 
that there must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws” (emphasis added)); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 
U.S. 220, 220-23 (1957) (finding sufficient minimum contacts through a single 
contact with the forum state). 
 45. 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). 
 46. Id.  World-Wide Volkswagen addressed the “stream of commerce” issue on a 
national scale after it was initially introduced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).  
The case involved interpretation of the Illinois long-arm statute, the first of its 
kind.  See supra note 39.  Accordingly, the Gray court held that a tort is committed 
wherever the resulting injury or damage occurs.  176 N.E.2d at 762.  Specifically, 
the court stated, “the place of wrong is where the last event takes place which is 
necessary to render the actor liable.”  Id. at 762-63.  Gray never actually used the 
words “stream of commerce” in its opinion but relied on the phrase “in the 
ordinary course of commerce.”  Id. at 766.  Twenty years later, World-Wide 
Volkswagen seemed to invalidate Gray’s approach by declaring that foreseeability 
alone is not enough to justify minimum contacts.  444 U.S. at 295. 
 47. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. 
8
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mere foreseeability alone was held inadequate.48  The Court also 
rejected the idea that factors of reasonableness, such as the level of 
inconvenience to a defendant to litigate in a foreign state, could 
outweigh the importance of the purposeful availment 
requirement.49 
In other words, World-Wide Volkswagen articulated that if a 
product finds its way into a state, and subsequently causes injury 
there, this is not enough to subject a foreign manufacturer or 
distributor to personal jurisdiction in that state.50  Instead, some 
effort to promote the product in the forum, albeit through direct or 
indirect channels, is required.51  Indeed, personal jurisdiction might 
be justified over a manufacturer or distributor that “delivers its 
products into the stream of commerce” with a reasonable expectation 
such products might be purchased in the forum state.52 
 
 48. Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).  World-
Wide Volkswagen follows Hanson’s lead in calling for purposeful availment by 
suggesting that if a foreign defendant sufficiently enjoys the benefits of a forum 
state, it might reasonably foresee being sued in that state.  Id.; see also MARCUS ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 695 n.4 (discussing Hanson).  In addition, World-Wide 
Volkswagen states, “[b]ut the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is 
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.  
Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”  444 U.S. 
at 297. 
 49. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.  The World-Wide Volkswagen Court 
states other factors that are insufficient to prevail over the purposeful availment 
requirement: 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from 
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the 
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; 
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the 
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. 
Id. 
 50. Id. at 297-98. 
 51. Id. at 297.  Stated in greater detail by the Court, “if the sale of a product 
. . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its 
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those 
States . . . .”  Id. 
 52. Id. at 298. 
9
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D.   The Power Struggle Continues: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court of California53 
Later, in Asahi, the Supreme Court went further, although in a 
split decision, to articulate a much stricter “stream of commerce” 
standard.54  The facts of Asahi dealt with an indemnification suit 
against a Japanese manufacturer in California.55  Ultimately, the 
holding of the case was broken into two major opinions, each 
written by Justice O’Connor.56  The first, a plurality opinion, 
focused on “minimum contacts,” while the second, a majority 
opinion, focused on notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”57 
In the plurality opinion, O’Connor stated that “more” is 
required for minimum contacts besides merely placing a product 
into the stream of commerce, even if the defendant knew the 
product could be “swe[pt] . . . into the forum State.”58  Accordingly, 
there must be some action on the part of the defendant to show 
“an intent or purpose to serve the market.”59  The opinion then 
goes on to list several examples of how a defendant’s activities 
could be “purposefully directed” at the forum, including 
“designing the product for the market in the forum State, 
advertising in the forum State . . . or marketing the product 
through a distributor . . . in the forum State.”60  Although Asahi’s 
minimum contacts analysis expressed a stricter standard than 
International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen, its authority is notably 
limited as a plurality opinion.61 
In deciding the second issue, however, a majority of the 
justices agreed that exercising jurisdiction in California would 
“offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”62  
Balancing factors of reasonableness, the Court placed considerable 
 
 53. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 54. Id. at 103-04, 108-13 (plurality opinion). 
 55. Id. at 106-08. 
 56. Id. at 104. 
 57. Id. at 102-04. 
 58. Id. at 112 (“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 104. 
 62. Id. at 104-05, 113-16 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945)). 
10
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emphasis on the burden of the defendant to defend in the forum 
state.63  Moreover, the Court seemed to attach specific relevance to 
the fact that the defendant was an international corporation.64  
Even so, Asahi is vague as to whether or not it is merely stipulating 
as a general proposition a greater concern for foreign-national 
defendants.65  As such, the degree of importance, if any, that should 
be placed on the existence of a foreign-national defendant in a 
personal jurisdiction situation remains uncertain.66 
In many ways, Asahi has done nothing but confuse personal 
jurisdiction matters even further with its split decision on the 
“stream of commerce” theory.67  And, to a lesser extent, the case 
also falls short by neglecting to address the issue of foreign-national 
defendants with any real conviction.68  Not surprisingly, Asahi has 
confounded many state courts, including those in Minnesota.69 
E.   Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota 
Minnesota has a long-arm statute that permits personal 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants in compliance with federal 
Due Process, or the standards of International Shoe.70  Indeed, the 
statute states in broad terms that personal jurisdiction in Minnesota 
applies to “foreign corporation[s] or any . . . nonresident 
individual[s] . . . transact[ing] any business within the state.”71  
Even though the statute does not specifically insist that its 
requirements extend to the federal Constitution, case law has 
supported this determination since the statute’s inception in 
 
 63. Id. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend 
oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the 
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national 
borders.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id; see also Baker, supra note 3, at 705 (stating that “Asahi did not help 
to clarify” stream of commerce standards). 
 68. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. 
 69. See Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 572-73 
(Minn. 2004); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 712 (“The circuit courts use varied 
approaches in applying the stream of commerce analysis in products liability cases 
that involve a nonresident defendant.”); Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-43 (discussing 
Minnesota methodologies). 
 70. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570; Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 
N.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Minn. 1992). 
 71. MINN. STAT. § 543.19 subd. 1(b) (2002). 
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1967.72  Thus, Minnesota’s long-arm statute is satisfied if the 
Constitutional requirements of personal jurisdiction from 
International Shoe are met.73 
Consequently, Minnesota has been challenged to develop its 
own process for analyzing personal jurisdiction in accordance with 
the principles of International Shoe.74  In 1976, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Hardrives, 
Inc. v. City of Lacrosse,75 which provides the following five-factor test 
for evaluating personal jurisdiction situations: (1) quantity of 
contacts, (2) quality of contacts, (3) connection between contacts 
and cause of action, (4) the state’s interest in providing a forum, 
and (5) the convenience of the parties.76  Similar to the Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation, Minnesota has also expressed that the first 
three factors, which deal with minimum contacts, have greater 
authority over the last two factors, which deal with fair play and 
substantial justice.77 
While analyzing personal jurisdiction cases, Minnesota has also 
encountered its own share of “stream of commerce” situations.78  
Notably, in Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., decided two years before Asahi 
and relying on World-Wide Volkswagen, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court upheld jurisdiction over a New Jersey manufacturer whose 
product injured a Minnesota resident.79  To reach its conclusion, 
 
 72. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 48:53 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d ed. 
Supp. 2006) (citing Minnesota’s long-arm statute in support of the notion that 
“[s]ome courts . . . only consider whether the extension of personal jurisdiction is 
consistent with due process, as the result of holdings that the state’s long-arm 
statutes reach as far as due process will allow”). 
 73. See Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570 (“Minnesota’s long-arm statute . . . permits 
Minnesota courts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent 
of federal due process.” (citing Valspar Corp., 495 N.W.2d at 410)). 
 74. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-43. 
 75. 240 N.W.2d 814, 307 Minn. 290 (1976). 
 76. Id. at 817, 307 Minn. at 294 (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 
187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965)). 
 77. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1985) (citing 
Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 
1983)).  However, the notion that the first three factors are more significant than 
the latter two factors was also initially adopted from the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
in Aftanase.  343 F.2d at 197. 
 78. See, e.g., Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 571 (citing Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722); In re 
Minn. Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996); Welsh v. Takekawa Iron 
Works Co., 529 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 79. See Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722.  The New Jersey defendant was the 
manufacturer of metal weights used in the common production of baseball bats.  
12
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the court applied its five-factor test and found that personal 
jurisdiction was warranted.80  The court’s analysis placed 
considerable importance on the first requirement, or “quantity of 
contacts,” finding the defendant’s indirect contacts through the 
stream of commerce enough to maintain jurisdiction and withstand 
World-Wide Volkswagen’s necessary showing of purposeful 
availment.81  The defendant’s lack of direct contacts with Minnesota 
did not significantly matter.82 
The Rostad court went on to evaluate the remaining four 
factors in support of jurisdiction over the New Jersey defendant.83  
In particular, the court acknowledged that it had afforded less 
weight in its application of the last two requirements, dealing with 
fair play and substantial justice, compared to the first three 
requirements, dealing with minimum contacts.84  In general, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Rostad followed World-Wide 
Volkswagen’s “stream of commerce” approach and held that the 
defendant had purposefully availed itself of “the benefits of doing 
business in Minnesota.”85 
 
Id. at 718.  One of these weights flew off a bat during a Minnesota softball game, 
injuring the plaintiff umpire and ultimately leading to a products liability claim.  
Id. 
 80. Id. at 719-20. 
 81. Id.  The defendant’s distribution contracts and marketing endeavors were 
found to be deliberate efforts worthy of establishing a national market for metal 
bat-weights, which included Minnesota.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 720-21. 
 83. Id. at 721-22.  Second, in evaluating the nature and “quality of the 
contacts,” the Rostad court found it especially significant that thousands of bats 
containing the defendant’s metal-weights were actually sold within the state.  Id. at 
722.  Furthermore, the company required its trademark, as well as a picture of its 
president, to be placed on every package.  Id.  In so doing, it “thrust its corporate 
image into the jurisdiction, both by its own packaging requirements and the 
actions of its distributors, and profited.”  Id.  Third, in analyzing the “connection of 
the contacts with the cause of action,” the court saw the relationship as 
overwhelmingly satisfied since the defendant had actively sought to create a 
national market and should have known it would include Minnesota.  Id.  Then, 
the court turned to the remaining two factors, while affording them lesser 
consideration compared to the first three.  Id.  Under the fourth requirement, the 
court found “Minnesota’s interest in litigating” the case “obvious,” since it was the 
site of the accident and home of the “severely injured.”  Id.  Then, in balancing 
the fifth consideration, the “convenience of the parties,” it found Minnesota 
jurisdiction the fairest under the circumstances, since only the defendant resided 
elsewhere.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 720, 722. 
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However, in analyzing the stream of commerce approach with 
regard to foreign-national defendants, the Minnesota judiciary has 
been reluctant to find sufficient minimum contacts, especially 
through indirect associations.86  For example, when dealing with a 
Japanese manufacturer in a products liability case, Welsh v. 
Takekawa Iron Works Co.,87 the Minnesota Court of Appeals provided 
a critical stream of commerce analysis, emphasizing the need for a 
clear showing of purposeful availment.88  Indeed, the court seemed 
to be moving towards a stricter standard, though citing Asahi only 
once, by asserting that a state’s authority might be limited when 
exercising personal jurisdiction over international defendants.89 
A year later, the Minnesota Supreme Court took its turn at 
deciding the issue of personal jurisdiction over foreign-national 
defendants with In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation.90 
Notably, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not authorize 
jurisdiction over an Australian defendant by way of indirect 
 
 86. See In re Minn. Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996); Welsh v. 
Takekawa Iron Works Co., 529 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 87. 529 N.W.2d at 471.  Plaintiff Welsh, a Minnesota citizen, had been 
“severely injured” while operating a rip-saw at his place of employment.  Id. at 472.  
The rip-saw first entered the stream of commerce when Japanese defendant, 
Takekawa, manufactured and shipped the product to an Arizona distributor.  Id.  
Subsequently, the rip-saw was sold to a Minnesota dealer and ultimately purchased 
by plaintiff’s Minnesota employer.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 474.  The court stressed the need for clear indications, more than 
just unilateral activities, of efforts to “directly or indirectly” serve the Minnesota 
market.  Id.  Specifically, the Welsh court stated that “[j]urisdiction cannot arise via 
the unilateral activity of someone other than the defendant.”  Id. (citing Helten v. 
Arthur J. Evers Corp., 372 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).  This notion 
was earlier stressed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara 
Fire Insurance Co., which states, “[a] customer’s unilateral act of bringing the 
corporation’s product into the forum state is insufficient to create personal 
jurisdiction.”  518 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980)).  In addition, the court 
emphasized that because the defendant’s contacts with Minnesota were so few and 
its corresponding sales in the state so insignificant, the court could not logically 
infer purposeful availment.  Welsh, 529 N.W.2d at 474-75. 
 89. Welsh, 529 N.W.2d at 475 (“We must, however, exercise caution in 
asserting jurisdiction over alien corporations, recognizing the additional burden 
experienced by one forced to defend itself in a foreign system.” (citing Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987))). 
 90. 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996).  The personal injury lawsuit, brought by 
187 plaintiffs, alleged that a group of defendants, including both resident 
companies and a foreign-national corporation, had caused significant harm by 
manufacturing, selling, or distributing asbestos materials for use in Minnesota.  Id. 
at 244. 
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contacts.91  The court characterized the narrow difference from its 
decision in Rostad by explaining that foreseeability had existed in 
Rostad through indirect contacts since the distributor had 
purposely sold the products in Minnesota on behalf of the 
manufacturer.92  Furthermore, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation 
stressed that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would 
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”93 
Although Minnesota has more recently seemed to call for 
stricter standards in establishing minimum contacts through the 
stream of commerce theory, it has also been reluctant to assertively 
base its decisions on guidance from Asahi.94  As a result, the 
application of personal jurisdiction standards in Minnesota has 
lacked affirmative direction.95  In summary, Rostad, Welsh, and In re 
Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, as well as other Minnesota predecessor 
cases, have fallen short of providing a needed interpretation of 
Minnesota’s stream of commerce position after Asahi; that is, until 
Juelich. 
 
 91. Id. at 244.  The Minnesota Supreme Court was unable to find merit in the 
plaintiffs’ and court of appeals’ contention that indirect contacts could be inferred 
through the international defendant’s sale of raw asbestos materials to another 
manufacturer for use in products that were sold to Minnesota dealers.  Id. at 247-
48.  In order for the Australian defendant to be on the hook, the supreme court 
called for more meaningful contact with the forum state than merely selling raw 
material to a manufacturer for use in a finished product; no matter that the 
injurious product was ultimately sold into the Minnesota marketplace.  Id. at 246-
47.  The manufacturer in this case was not equivalent to defendant’s distributor, so 
personal jurisdiction could not be justified through indirect contacts.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 247.  “Unlike the defendants in Rostad, the record does not indicate 
that [the distributor’s] contacts with Minnesota were on behalf of [the 
manufacturer] or with [the manufacturer’s] approval.”  Id.  However, in 
comparison, one commentator has found the analysis of In re Minnesota Asbestos 
Litigation rather troubling, concluding that it “furthered the confusion for those 
litigating in Minnesota.”  Hagel, supra note 4, at 231-32 (arguing that the court did 
not adequately explain its reasoning). 
 93. 552 N.W.2d at 248.  Yet, in its analysis, the court never references greater 
degrees of unfairness in binding foreign-national defendants, nor does it even cite 
Asahi.  See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
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III.  THE JUELICH DECISION 
A.   Facts and Procedural History 
In Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp.,96 the plaintiff was 
injured in Minnesota while repairing a component part of a laser-
cutting machine.97  Both the part and the laser-cutting machine 
were manufactured in Japan.98  Consequently, the plaintiff brought 
products liability and personal injury suits against (1) the 
component part manufacturer, Meikikou, and (2) the machine 
manufacturer, Yamazaki Mazak Optonics/Mazak Nissho Iwai 
(YMO/MANI).99 
In Juelich, the stream of commerce chain began with Meikikou, 
a Japanese corporation that manufactured the original component 
part, a scissor-lift table, at its factory in Japan.100  YMO/MANI then 
created a laser-cutting device, using Meikikou’s scissor-lift table as a 
component part.101  Subsequently, the laser-cutting machine made 
its way into the Midwest when YMO/MANI sold it to a Minnesota 
supplier, Gladwin Machinery & Supply Company (Gladwin).102  
Gladwin then sold the machine to plaintiff’s employer, also a 
Minnesota company, Aries Precision Sheet Metal Company 
(Aries).103  As a result of the sale to Aries, YMO/MANI’s service 
specialist installed the laser-cutting machine at Aries and gave 
 
 96. 682 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2004). 
 97. Id. at 568.  In summary, plaintiff was injured in Minnesota while repairing 
Meikikou’s product, a scissor-lift table, which had been used to manufacture 
Yamazaki Mazak Optonics/Mazak Nissho Iwai’s (YMO/MANI’s) laser-cutting 
machine.  Id.  Meikikou did not sell directly to a Minnesota supplier but placed its 
product into the stream of commerce through YMO/MANI.  Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  For the sake of simplicity, Yamazaki Mazak Optonics and Mazak 
Nissho Iwai (YMO/MANI) are treated in this case note as one party.  In actuality, 
YMO and MANI are two separate, but affiliated, companies.  YMO is the Japanese 
manufacturer of the laser-cutting device that contained Meikikou’s component 
part.  Id. at 568.  MANI is YMO’s Illinois subsidiary corporation, an international 
distributor that sold the laser-cutting device to the United States.  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  Through its distribution affiliates, Mekikou sold the part to YMO, a 
Japanese manufacturer.  Id.  The laser-cutting device was marketed as a packaged 
system, known as the “Super Turbo X510 System.”  Id. 
 102. Id.  Evidence provided at the time of the dispute indicated that a total of 
122 laser-cutting machines had been sold in the United States, including 17 in 
Minnesota.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
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plaintiff and another employee specific training in its use.104 
After plaintiff brought his original action, YMO/MANI 
responded with a cross-claim against Meikikou.105  Meikikou then 
moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims and YMO/MANI’s cross-claim 
for lack of personal jurisdiction.106  Subsequently, all claims against 
Meikikou were dismissed by the district court.107  The court of 
appeals affirmed by relying on Justice O’Connor’s “stream of 
commerce” analysis in Asahi.108  Plaintiff went on to settle his claims 
with YMO/MANI and did not seek further review.109  As such, the 
only issue left for the Minnesota Supreme Court to evaluate in 
Juelich was the motion to dismiss YMO/MANI’s cross-claim for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.110 
B.   The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
1.   A Personal Jurisdiction Platform 
Basically, the Juelich opinion is organized into a “guidebook” 
for analyzing personal jurisdiction cases in Minnesota.111  At the 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 569. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  Mekikou’s motion for dismissal, which was granted by the district 
court, was primarily based on the affidavit of the company’s Managing Director 
and General Manager of Development, Tsutomu Odaguchi.  Id.  In his deposition, 
Odaguchi testified that Meikikou (1) lacks any involvement with the scissor-lift 
component parts once they leave the factory; (2) does not sell its scissor-lift tables 
directly to the United States; (3) sells the scissor-lift tables only to Japanese 
companies, some of which in turn use the parts in products that are sold to the 
United States; (4) makes English language warning labels but only produces 
Japanese language operating manuals; and (5) would install any necessary parts to 
comply with safety standards when YMO alerted it of a product sale (containing a 
Meikikou component party) to another country.  Id. 
 108. Id.  Furthermore, Juelich states that “[t]he court of appeals concluded that 
Asahi ‘clarified the stream of commerce theory,’ quoting from Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion that the ‘placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed toward the forum 
State.’”  Id. at 569 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 
U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). 
 109. Id. at 569. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 565.  The opinion opens with an introduction describing the 
primary issues, facts and procedural history of the Juelich case.  Id. at 568-69.  It is 
then neatly organized into two parts, including sub-sections, outlining the steps 
needed for analyzing Minnesota personal jurisdiction disputes.  Id. at 569-75.  Part 
17
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outset, the court notes that the major issue, the jurisdictional 
validity of YMO/MANI’s cross-claim, is keenly similar to the issue 
decided in Asahi.112  Indeed, the comparison of Juelich to Asahi is 
made in the first sentence of the opinion, seeming to set the stage 
for an evaluation of Minnesota personal jurisdiction law in 
juxtaposition with the infamous U.S. Supreme Court decision.113  
The opening of Juelich goes on to introduce the facts and 
procedural background of the case, after which it is split into two 
parts.114  In summary, Part I serves to confirm Minnesota’s personal 
jurisdiction rules, while Part II applies these rules in light of 
Juelich.115 
The Minnesota Supreme Court creates a legal framework for 
personal jurisdiction by providing a historical overview of 
jurisdictional law, reaffirming Minnesota’s five-factor test modeled 
after the Eighth Circuit, confirming Minnesota’s use of the “stream 
of commerce” theory with reliance on Rostad, and emphasizing the 
importance of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”116  The court begins by reviewing standard personal 
jurisdiction law, aptly modeled after International Shoe.117  First, it 
references its long-arm statute, which “permits Minnesota courts to 
assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent of 
federal due process.”118  Second, it declares that such “[d]ue 
process requires that the defendant have ‘certain minimum 
contacts’ with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the defendant does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
 
I provides an introduction of personal jurisdiction with three sub-headings, 
Minnesota’s Five-Factor Test, The Stream of Commerce Theory of Minimum Contacts, and 
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice.  Id. at 569-73.  Part II goes on 
to analyze each of the components of the five-factor test as separate sub-headings:  
(1) The quantity of contacts with the forum state, (2) The nature and quality of Meikikou’s 
contacts, (3) The connection of the cause of action with these contacts, (4) The interest of the 
state in providing a forum, and (5) The convenience of the parties.  Id. at 573-76.  Justice 
Anderson’s concurring opinion follows the conclusion of the Juelich majority.  Id. 
at 576-78. 
 112. Id. at 567. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 115. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 569, 573. 
 116. Id. at 569-73. 
 117. Id. at 570. 
 118. Id. (citing Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 
(Minn. 1992)).  
18
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and substantial justice.’”119 
To analyze the Constitutional requirements of personal 
jurisdiction according to International Shoe, the court firmly 
acknowledges its use of the Eighth Circuit’s five-factor test: (1) 
quantity of contacts, (2) quality of contacts, (3) connection 
between contacts and cause of action, (4) the state’s interest in 
providing a forum, and (5) the convenience of the parties.120  
Additionally, the court connects the five-factor test to the standards 
of International Shoe by stating that the first three factors measure 
minimum contacts, while the last two factors measure 
reasonableness according to “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”121  It also expresses reliance on the First 
Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach to interpreting the “interplay” 
between minimum contacts and reasonableness.122  In essence, the 
stronger a plaintiff’s case regarding minimum contacts, the more a 
defendant will need to prove regarding the unreasonableness of 
the situation, and vice versa.123 
2.   The Stream of Commerce Approach 
In determining how to apply the first three factors, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court revisits its “stream of commerce” theory 
of minimum contacts in light of Asahi.124  First, describing its 
decision in Rostad, the court recognizes the “stream of commerce” 
concept utilized by World-Wide Volkswagen, stating that minimum 
contacts could indeed be “indirect.”125  The court goes so far as to 
quote its finding in Rostad that “[the manufacturer’s] distribution 
contacts and marketing efforts were calculated attempts to create a 
national market for [its] product, a market which specifically 
includes Minnesota.”126  In addition, the court makes a lengthy 
 
 119. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 120. Id. (citing Hardrives, Inc. v. City of Lacrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 294, 240 
N.W.2d 814, 817 (1976)). 
 121. Id. (citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 
1994)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 571. 
 125. Id. (citing Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985)).  
Interestingly, Juelich does not reference its decision in In re Minnesota Asbestos 
Litigation when citing Rostad, which relied on a more narrow interpretation of 
World-Wide Volkswagen’s allowance for indirect contacts.  See id. 
 126. Id.  The court notes that “the decision in Rostad relied upon the ‘stream-
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citation to World-Wide Volkswagen’s “stream of commerce” analysis, 
emphasizing the importance of “purposeful availment.”127 
Again, the opinion compares Juelich to Asahi, noting their 
“strikingly similar” factual situations.128  But due to the uncertainty 
of a plurality opinion, the court specifically declines to use Asahi’s 
stricter test for determining minimum contacts, stating, “[b]ecause 
the Asahi Court failed to reach a majority . . . it was error for the 
court of appeals to rely on Justice O’Connor’s ‘something more’ 
approach in this case.”129  Nonetheless, the Juelich court is sure to 
acknowledge that a majority of the Justices in Asahi agreed that 
exercising personal jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant would 
“offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”130  
Furthermore, the court notes its own concern with placing burdens 
on international defendants.131 
3.   A Closer Look at the Five-Factor Approach 
The court finds its five-factor test to be the soundest approach 
for analyzing personal jurisdiction in Minnesota.132  It reasons that 
the first three factors, “which trace their roots to the landmark 
decision of International Shoe and its progeny,” continue to provide 
the proper analysis for minimum contacts.133  The court recognizes 
minimum contacts through indirect activity if compliance with 
purposeful availment is met but rejects Asahi’s stricter “something 
more” requirement.134  Yet, in recognition of the Justices’ 
agreement in Asahi, the court reasons that factors four and five are 
sufficient for weighing “fair play and substantial justice” and are 
 
of-commerce theory’ enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.”  Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  The court notes that both Asahi and Juelich specifically dealt with 
indemnification suits between foreign-national defendants.  Id.  The court also 
notes the timing in comparison to Minnesota’s analysis of stream of commerce 
situations, since Asahi was decided two years after Rostad.  Id. 
 129. Id. at 572. 
 130. Id. at 573 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945)). 
 131. Id. at 576. 
 132. Id. at 573.  The court notes that “[t]o determine whether Meikikou is 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota, [it] will apply the five-factor test.”  
Id. 
 133. Id. at 572. 
 134. Id. 
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consistent with ensuring Constitutional Due Process.135 
The court goes on to analyze potential jurisdiction over 
Meikikou in Minnesota by each of the five factors.136  In its 
investigation of the first three factors, the court does not find 
sufficient minimum contacts between Meikikou and Minnesota.137  
First, the court considers the “quantity of contacts” insignificant, 
since Meikikou’s interactions with Minnesota are far less than those 
at issue in both Rostad and Asahi.138  Second, in measuring the 
“quality of contacts,” the court is unable to support purposeful 
availment, as Meikikou lacks any real “influence” or “control” over 
the distribution of the laser-cutting machine in Minnesota.139  
Third, given the shortage of purposeful availment and the “mere 
unilateral activity” of numerous suppliers in distributing Meikikou’s 
product, a proper “connection between the contacts and the cause 
of action” does not exist.140 
In addition, in balancing factors four and five, the court also 
holds that the demands on Meikikou in asserting jurisdiction are 
remarkably unjust under the circumstances.141  For example, when 
assessing factor four, “the state’s interest in providing a forum,” the 
court finds the situation “virtually identical to that in Asahi” and 
cannot gather any logical reason as to why a suit of indemnification 
between two Japanese companies should be litigated in 
Minnesota.142  Then, in looking at factor five, “convenience of the 
parties,” the court holds that the burdens to Meikikou to defend 
itself in a foreign country far outweigh any remaining interest 
 
 135. Id. at 572-73. 
 136. Id. at 573-76. 
 137. Id. at 573-74. 
 138. Id.  The fact that there were seventeen Meikikou component parts located 
in Minnesota and a total of 122 located in the United States was not enough to 
satisfy the “quantity of contacts” requirement.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 574.  The opinion states that Meikikou “took no initiative in 
developing a United States market . . . [and] its actions fall short of the affirmative 
efforts to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in the United 
States, as required by World-Wide Volkswagen.”  Id.  At particular issue is the 
existence and use of Meikikou’s website to promote its component part.  Id.  
However, the court determined that the website was “passive” and not in support 
of jurisdiction.  Id.; see also MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 756-59 (describing 
recent developments in minimum contacts and the Internet). 
 140. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 575. 
 141. Id. at 575-76. 
 142. Id. at 575. 
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Minnesota has in controlling the cross-claim.143 
In the end, the cross-claim asserted against Meikikou by 
YMO/MANI does not pass Minnesota’s test.144  Yet, the Juelich 
decision seems to do more than merely uphold a five-factor 
formula.  Indeed, it confirms Minnesota’s position in light of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s most important personal jurisdiction cases, 
Asahi in particular, and provides guidance for analyzing stream of 
commerce situations.145 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE JUELICH DECISION 
The Juelich case is significant because it provides the Minnesota 
legal community with a definitive roadmap for handling personal 
jurisdiction disputes.  Most importantly, it represents a direct 
confrontation and ultimate denial of Asahi’s stricter use of the 
“stream of commerce” theory.146  Even though Juelich seems to avoid 
an underlying issue of fair play and substantial justice with regard 
to foreign-national defendants, it succeeds overall in enhancing 
Minnesota personal jurisdiction law. 
A.   The Stream of Commerce Issue 
By the time Juelich reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, it 
involved only a cross-claim.147  Nonetheless, the court used the case 
as an opportunity to take on Asahi’s infamous “stream of 
commerce” theory of minimum contacts.  In fact, Juelich rejects the 
court of appeals’ use of this stricter standard primarily due to the 
Justices’ inability to provide a majority opinion in Asahi.148  By 
making a sound statement against the use of Asahi’s stream of 
commerce theory, the supreme court ended pre-existing confusion 
in Minnesota regarding the issue.149  In addition, Juelich leaves the 
 
 143. Id. at 576.  The court notes that “[g]iven that the transaction on which 
the indemnification claim is based took place in Japan and Meikikou delivered the 
lift table in Japan, YMO/MANI have ‘not demonstrated that it is more convenient 
to litigate its indemnification claim’ in Japan.”  Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 570-73. 
 146. Id. at 572. 
 147. Id. at 569. 
 148. Id. at 572. 
 149. See supra Part II.E.; see also Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-42 (discussing 
Minnesota’s struggles with personal jurisdiction). 
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door open for “indirect” minimum contacts by reaffirming its prior 
decision in Rostad, which had relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
findings in World-Wide Volkswagen.150  For example, when describing 
Asahi’s stricter approach in detail, the supreme court notably 
referred to Justice Brennan’s concurrence, which had revisited 
World-Wide Volkswagen’s acceptance of either “direct or indirect” 
contacts.151 
B.   The Fair Play and Substantial Justice Issue 
On the other hand, the court was quick to utilize Asahi’s 
majority findings on “fair play and substantial justice” in analyzing 
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, especially between 
two international companies.152  In comparison, the court stated, 
“like Asahi, it is ‘not at all clear at this point’ that Minnesota law 
should govern the question of whether a Japanese corporation 
should indemnify another Japanese corporation.”153  Indeed, the 
court never wavered in its findings of significant unfairness to 
Meikikou, an international component part manufacturer.154  Thus, 
like the Court in Asahi, the Minnesota Supreme Court was also 
reluctant to extend the principle of personal jurisdiction to 
international, third-party component manufacturers in 
indemnification suits.155  Although the court might hint that the 
state’s interest could be different if the plaintiff were still seeking 
jurisdiction over Meikikou, given the procedural posture of the 
case, it was not required to analyze this potential situation, nor did 
it choose to do so.156  As such, the “strikingly similar” factual 
situations of Juelich and Asahi seem to work against defining a 
clearer picture for Minnesota regarding the growing issue of 
foreign-national defendants.157  Indeed, the narrow, factual 
resemblance of the two cases allowed the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to neglect a broader issue of jurisdiction over international 
 
 150. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 571. 
 151. Id. at 572. 
 152. Id. at 575-76. 
 153. Id. at 575. 
 154. Id. at 576. 
 155. Id. at 575. 
 156. Id.  The court finds that even if plaintiff were still a party to the case, the 
unfairness in bringing Meikikou into court would still outweigh the state’s interest 
in allowing the cross-claim to proceed.  Id. 
 157. Id. at 571. 
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parties.158  Thereby, the Minnesota Supreme Court left certain 
questions unanswered, including: What if the case is not a cross-
claim but a legitimate claim between a Minnesota citizen and an 
international defendant?  How should Minnesota courts interpret 
the stream of commerce theory under such hypothetical 
circumstances?  Unfortunately, Juelich does not specifically address 
these lingering propositions. 
C.   Asahi Criticism? 
Even though Juelich states how to deal with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s indecisiveness, it does not directly challenge the analysis of 
Asahi.  In fact, it avoids the notion of whether or not the five-factor 
scale should tip back the other way, with unfairness taking 
precedence over minimum contacts when evaluating jurisdiction 
over foreign-national parties.159  Interestingly, in Juelich, Justice Paul 
H. Anderson’s concurring opinion seems to shed more light on 
some of Asahi’s problems, especially regarding foreign-national 
defendants, by finding sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
as well as substantial unfairness to the defendant.160 
Although Justice Anderson’s concurring opinion agrees with 
the majority findings regarding factors four and five, it sides with 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi, which states that the suit 
represented “one of those rare cases in which minimum 
requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial 
justice’ . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction.”161  Thus, 
Justice Anderson did not find it necessary to even approach the 
minimum contacts analysis in such a situation, as unfairness should 
take precedence over minimum contacts.162 
Yet, in comparing the majority’s analysis to his own 
examination of the first three factors and also analogizing to 
Rostad, Justice Anderson found sufficient evidence of minimum 
contacts.163  One notable fact in his reasoning was that Meikikou 
had actually purchased an insurance policy to cover U.S. products-
 
 158. Id. at 575. 
 159. See id. at 577 (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 576-78. 
 161. Id. at 576 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 
U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 162. Id. at 577. 
 163. Id. at 577-78. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/6
07BARTSH.DOC 5/31/2006  1:12:31 PM 
2006] SWIMMING UP THE “STREAM OF COMMERCE”  1433 
 
liability claims.164  Justice Anderson further emphasized “that the 
trend toward globalized business must factor into our analysis.”165 
In summary, the concurring opinion delves deeper into the 
legacy of Asahi by attempting to interpret its effect on current 
developments in economics and global business.166  Certainly, the 
concurrence makes a valid point, given that Minnesota maintains a 
healthy business environment with nineteen Fortune 500 
companies and a strong medium-sized business base that includes 
relevant interaction with international companies.167  It can also be 
logically assumed that Minnesota commerce and dealings with 
foreign-national corporations will continue to grow in frequency 
and substance.168  As such, a clearer understanding of how to 
handle disputes between Minnesota citizens and international 
parties from the Juelich majority might have been welcomed by both 
the Minnesota business and legal communities. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Even though Juelich represents an analysis of a cross-claim, its 
resulting opinion is quite significant, providing a comprehensive 
overview of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction position.  Without a 
doubt, confusing U.S. Supreme Court opinions such as Asahi have 
made it difficult for analyzing theories of minimum contacts with 
regard to foreign defendants, especially when it comes to the 
“stream of commerce” theory.169  But despite these complexities in 
the current state of the law, the holding of Juelich manages to give 
Minnesota a platform for dealing with personal jurisdiction.  
Although it falls short of providing greater insight into global 
economic trends, its overall outcome is undeniably important, 
particularly with regard to applying the stream of commerce 
analysis to corporations. 
As Minnesota’s first real interpretation of Asahi, Juelich rightly 
 
 164. Id. at 577. 
 165. Id. at 578. 
 166. Id. at 577-78. 
 167. Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, 
Business Trends, http://www.deed.state.mn.us/facts/businesstrends.htm (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
 168. See Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, 
Global Competitiveness, http://www.deed.state.mn.us/facts/global.htm (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
 169. See supra Part II.B.-D. 
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rejects a stricter “stream of commerce” standard and suggests that 
indirect contacts might warrant jurisdiction under reasonable 
circumstances.170  Juelich also reaffirms Minnesota’s five-factor test, 
giving structure to Minnesota personal jurisdiction law.  Indeed, its 
analysis of minimum contacts clearly demonstrates that applying 
“stream of commerce” theories is no simple task.171  But, thanks to 
Juelich, Minnesota is no longer left to the uncertainty of swimming 
up the “stream of commerce.”  At least until the next major 
evolvement in the law, Minnesota has a sound methodology for 
interpretation of its personal jurisdiction cases. 
 
 
 170. See supra Part IV.A. 
 171. See Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 565.  The different results of the majority and 
concurring opinions in interpreting minimum contacts reveals significant 
potential for variance, even when analyzing the same fact situation under the same 
“stream of commerce” theory.  Id. 
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